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ABSTRACT 
Small and medium enterprises are crucial for economies all around the globe. However, 
their growth is constrained by strong difficulties in accessing the funds they 
imperatively need. This study reviews some the most common issues regarding SME 
finance, particularly difficulty accessing funds and Relationship Lending. It then aims to 
assess the perceptions of SMEs in the Azores region over those issues, to see if they 
match the literature considerations. The majority of the respondents claim they find it 
difficult to access finance from a bank, and consider trouble providing risk shifting 
factors and past success indicators as being the most important credit decision making 
criteria of banks. It is also found that most of the respondents are invested in a 
relationship with a bank, and those who are benefit from it, especially on collateral 
demands and on interest rates. 
Keywords: Relationship Lending; SME; Information asymmetry; Bank finance; 
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RESUMO 
Pequenas e médias empresas desempenham um papel importante na economia mundial. 
No entanto, a elevada dificuldade em aceder aos fundos necessários muitas vezes limita 
o crescimento destas empresas. Este estudo tem como propósito analisar alguns dos 
mais debatidos problemas no que a financiamento de PMEs diz respeito, 
particularmente Relacionamento Bancário e dificuldades no acesso ao financiamento. 
Posteriormente, realiza um exercício comparativo entre a percepção de PMEs na Região 
Autónoma dos Açores e as mais comuns considerações presentes na literatura. A 
maioria dos inquiridos considera que o acesso ao financiamento bancário é difícil, e 
percepciona os critérios relacionados com garantias e com o histórico de crédito da 
empresa como os mais importantes para as decisões de concessão de crédito dos bancos. 
A maioria dos inquiridos considera igualmente estar envolvido em Relacionamento 
Bancário, retirando benefícios dessa relação. 
Palavras-chave: Relacionamento Bancário; PME; Assimetria informacional; 
Financiamento bancário.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of enterprises (99,8%) in the European Union (EU) are Small and 
Medium Enterprises
1
 (SMEs), accounting for 66,4% of the jobs provided (European 
Commission, 2013A). These companies play an important role in the economic 
dynamics of most countries, especially high and middle-income countries (Stein, 2002). 
To be able to operate, most SMEs require access to finance (European Commission, 
2013B). However, that is one of the most dominant concerns for SMEs (European 
Central Bank, 2013), mainly because of asymmetric information problems
2
 (Berger & 
Udell, 1995). In this scenario, banks have significant importance, playing an important 
role in gathering crucial information for the lending decision process, especially when 
associated with Relationship Lending
3
 (RL) (Berger & Udell, 1995). 
This study provides an insight over the most common debated issues about SME 
finance. Then, through a survey, it aims to assess how SMEs in the islands of São 
Miguel and Santa Maria (Azores) percept some of this issues. SMEs play an important 
role in the economy of the region, providing 74,4% of the jobs (Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística, 2010). The study is of interest for these firms, since it may provide valuable 
insights by comparing their perceptions to extensive studies conducted in SME finance. 
To do so, it is first presented a literature review over the most common debated issues in 
the literature, and over the issues specifically related to the study: Access to bank 
finance and RL technology. Then, through a survey aimed at SMEs, answers are
                                                 
1
 Enterprises that employ fewer than 250 and which have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 
million EUR. 
2
 SMEs are vulnerable to information problems, making it difficult for lenders to access their 
creditworthiness (Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández, & Udell, 2009). 
3
 Lending technology that involves the collection of information over time for credit availability 
decision-making (Mudd, 2013). 
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 collected that can be related to these issues. In the results section, those answers are 
presented. It then concludes with comparing the respondents’ answers to the 
considerations in the literature. 
1.1 Motivations for the Study 
The main motivation for this study comes from the importance of SMEs for economies 
all around the globe, especially since the part these firms play in economic growth and 
job creation is especially important nowadays in times of economic crisis. 
The reason the study was developed in the Azores region, specifically in the Eastern 
Group (Islands of São Miguel and Santa Maria), comes mainly from the fact that most 
of its companies are SMEs. Although this is not a particular distinguishing characteristic 
from the rest of the country, only 12 firms in the rank of the 100 largest firms in the 
whole Azores region are large enterprises (Espírito Santo Research, 2009). According to 
the president of the government, in 2012, the difficult situation firms were going 
through in the country had a specific and larger impact in the Azores region (Governo 
dos Açores, 2012). One reason pointed out for that was the bank financing crisis, being 
this type of financing crucial to the region’s economic development (Governo dos 
Açores, 2012). Another motivation is the fact that the region leads the rate of business 
renewal in the country, where between March of 2013 and February 2014 the index of 
renovation of businesses was the establishment of 3,9 enterprises for each one dissolved 
(Governo dos Açores, 2014). 
An aspect debated in the literature regarding SME finance is the particular difficulty 
that SMEs show in accessing finance and their historical tendency to rely on banks to do 
so (European Commission, 2013B). The generic perception among many authors that 
RL is a lending technology that benefits SMEs is also a common opinion, since it helps 
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to overcome information problems particular to SMEs (Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Carbó-
Valverde et al, 2009). 
1.2 Objectives and Contribution of the Study 
This study has two main objectives. The first one is to verify how SMEs in the Eastern 
Group of the Azores rate the difficulty in accessing bank credit, and if they do so 
accordingly with the literature. Along with this, the study analyzes their perception over 
the factors they think affect their chance in accessing finance, comparing this perception 
to the literature considerations. The second one is to verify if RL is common in region, 
and if SMEs perceive the benefits of this technology and the reasons why those exist 
accordingly with the reasons and justifications presented in the literature. 
In a way, the contributions of the study overlap with its objectives. Insights about the 
first objective may give firm owners important information to consider when applying 
for a line of credit. They may more correctly consider the important credit decision-
making criteria of banks. On the second objective, it may be of interest to many firm 
owners to more accurately know what potential benefits may come from RL. It may 
also provide an insight about if those benefits are generally observed, and if so, why that 
is. 
From this point on, the study is structured as follows: the next section provides a grasp 
on the literature regarding SME finance. A description of the survey structure and its 
availability to SMEs in the region follow, in the methodology section. In the results 
section the answers to the survey are presented. In the conclusions section, those 
answers are compared and evaluated in light of the literature considerations. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, some of the most debated issues regarding SME finance and RL are 
presented. 
2.1 The Importance of SMEs 
A strong indicator of the importance of SMEs is that they account for a large share of 
companies in the private sector of most economies, as well as for a large share of the 
overall employment (Beck, 2007). 
In many countries, the majority of jobs are provided by SMEs, and the SME sector has 
a very significant contribution to the national GDP
4
 (International Finance Corporation, 
2009). 
According to the European Commission (2013B), new firms represent the most 
important source of new employment, creating more than 4 million jobs every year in 
Europe. They contribute, alongside entrepreneurship, to more competitive economies 
and innovation, encouraging new skills and capabilities and opening up markets 
(European Commission, 2013B). 
2.2 The Importance of Bank Financing for SMEs 
A survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the Euro area conducted by the European 
Central Bank (2013) concludes that access to finance is mentioned as the second most 
dominant concern for SMEs, only behind “finding customers”. According to another 
survey on SME access to finance, performed by the European Commission, 50% of EU 
SMEs have taken out a loan in the past two years (Ipsos Mori, 2013). 
SMEs need external financing to innovate and grow their activities, especially since 
they are important job creators and contribute both to competitiveness and innovation 
                                                 
4
 Gross domestic product 
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(St-Pierre & Bahri, 2011), and their ability to access external financing is a topic that 
deserves increased attention (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
In the words of Petersen and Rajan (1994), in a frictionless capital market funds will 
always be available to firms with good investment opportunities. But that is not so. And 
due to these firms’ importance, the extent to which a financial system will show itself as 
being able to support their growth is a measure of its efficiency (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). 
Asymmetric information problems are a source of friction. They are a bigger issue to 
smaller firms, which explains why obtaining credit for them is a different process when 
compared to that of a larger firm (Berger & Udell, 1995). While large corporations are 
able to obtain credit in public debt markets, a small firm will usually depend on a 
financial intermediary, such as a commercial bank (Berger & Udell, 1995). This type of 
financing (bank financing) often is associated with a long-term relationship, and this 
relationship may play an important role in the gathering of information and in setting 
the terms of the loan (Berger & Udell, 1995). A bank might also play an important role 
in overcoming asymmetric information problems because the borrower will be able to 
disclose information to it without worrying about it spilling over to competitors (Boot, 
2000). 
Since SME’s usually do not have access to organized capital markets, bank financing 
will often be the only alternative for external funding (Behr & Guttler, 2007). 
2.3 The Importance of Information 
Information, as well as bargaining, is a key element of loan contracting (Grunert & 
Norden, 2012). 
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) state that it is crucial for prudent lenders to gather 
information about the credit worthiness of their borrowers. According to the same 
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authors, to do so the lender may choose between different alternatives: he may require 
an application for the loan, along with specific financial information, or alternatively 
rely on his relationship with the potential borrower and on the information gathered 
through the provision of different financial services (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
Through this means, the lender learns important information, which then relates to the 
probability of the potential borrower being able to repay the loan (Elyasiani & 
Goldberg, 2004). 
When an officer of a bank lacks the adequate information to decide whether to fund or 
not a certain proposal, he will be dealing with the problem of asymmetric information 
(Deakins et al, 2010). When approached by a new business, the officer will have to face 
this, since the business does not have a trading history (Deakins et al, 2010). 
Similarly, many SMEs will likely face the same problem. Because these are smaller 
firms, it will be unlikely that they are monitored by a rating agency or followed by the 
press (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
For an SME, the informational gap that exists between an insider and an outsider is 
bigger than that of a larger firm, and that makes the provision of external finance more 
challenging (Berger & Udell, 2002). A small firm with an opportunity to invest in a 
worthy project may face trouble doing so, in a case where the potential lender lacks the 
information to verify the firm’s access to the project, or to ensure that the funds will in 
fact go to that same project, and not another one (Berger & Udell, 2002). 
Unlike it has been for larger firms, the information available about SMEs has 
historically been limited and difficult to access, because they are traditionally more 
opaque (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). 
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2.3.1 Moral Hazard and the Adverse Selection Effect 
When the lender cannot verify that the potential borrower has access to a quality 
project, he faces the information related problem of adverse selection (Berger & Udell, 
2002). If the lender has trouble ensuring the provided funds will not be diverted to an 
alternative project or purpose, he faces the moral hazard problem (Berger & Udell, 
2002). 
The essence of the adverse selection effect refers to the lender’s inability to distinguish 
a good firm from a bad one, when confronted with a number of options (Hyytinen & 
Vaananen, 2006). In turn, the essence of moral hazard refers to problems the lender 
faces after providing the finance, and that may endanger the repayment (Hyytinen & 
Vaananen, 2006). 
Both are information related problems, and have greater impact when a firm is young or 
small, which explains why that same firm will find it hard to raise money in the public 
markets (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Because these borrowers tend to be more opaque, 
they pose a greater challenge for lenders (Cole, Goldberg, & White, 2004). 
2.4 On Relationship Lending 
This section reviews the most common stands within the literature regarding RL. The 
the characteristics that are more often observed in this kind of relationship and the 
benefits that usually result from it are analyzed. The characteristics can be looked upon 
as the factors that allow the RL technology to be implemented and that allow the 
borrower to collect benefits from it. 
2.4.1 Relationship Lending 
Although there are many ways of obtaining information for credit decision making, 
developing a long-term relationship between a lender and a borrower is especially well 
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suited for opaque firms (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). RL is an area of great interest for 
financial institutions and SMEs, since it allows the lender to gather relevant information 
about the creditworthiness and prospects of borrowers (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
Altman and Sabato (2007) find that managing credit risk for SMEs requires a specific 
procedure, especially since these firms are different from a credit risk point of view. 
RL involves the collection of information that acts as the primary basis for decision-
making on credit availability (Mudd, 2013). This information is acquired over time 
through contact with the firm, its owners, management and local community (Mudd, 
2013). It is a powerful technology to overcome information problems in SME financing 
(Berger & Udell, 2002). 
The close relationship developed with the borrower over time may help overcome 
problems of asymmetric information, by allowing the acquisition of borrower-specific 
information available only to the intermediary and the customer (Boot, 2000). 
Boot (2000) defines RL around two dimensions: proprietary information and 
multiple interactions. According to his definition, RL is the provision of financial 
services by a financial intermediary that invests in obtaining customer-specific 
information and evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple 
interactions with that same customer over time and/or across products. 
2.4.2 Soft Information 
Stein (2002) argues that the key distinguishing characteristic of lending to SMEs is that 
it relies heavily in information that is soft. 
This information is not directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it 
(Stein, 2002). As an example: the case of a loan officer that works with a small 
company president and has come to believe he is honest and hard working. He is unable 
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to unambiguously document these features in a report to pass along to his superiors 
(Stein, 2002). 
The loan officer in direct contact with the borrower acquires this information and it 
often remains proprietary, because it is not easily observed, verified and transmitted to 
others (Berger & Udell, 2006). Soft data, such as information about the character and 
reliability of the firm’s owner, is difficult to quantify and communicate through normal 
transmission channels of banking organization (Berger & Udell, 2002). 
The loan officer typically lives in the local community and has relevant information 
about the firm and its owner and about the business conditions in the community, 
making him or her the person in the bank with greatest access to the soft information 
(Berger & Udell, 2002). 
2.4.3 Characteristics 
In this section, the characteristics that are most commonly observed in relationships 
between lender and borrower, when the lender is a bank invested in RL with a borrower, 
are discussed.  
2.4.3.1 Distance 
Being that soft information is difficult to communicate, it is reasonable to accept that 
the decision to offer credit has to be made close to where this information is accessed 
(Petersen & Rajan, 2002). 
Because of the informational opacity of SMEs, the collection of soft information 
requires contact between the lender and the borrower. This is facilitated by geographic 
proximity (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
However, Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that the physical distance between 
SMEs and their lenders has grown steadily and considerably. Also, they find that 
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borrowers that start a relationship with a lender at a distance are communicating less in 
person. 
This is explained by the ability to collect, store, and process and communicate larger 
amounts of information (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). Most of this information is hard, and 
is available to lenders at a distance, who now have easy and timely accessible 
information about a potential borrower’s creditworthiness, even without the soft 
information that would be able through close contact (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). At the 
same time, this information is different. It is stored, processed and distributed in a 
different way, and changes the nature of lending (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). If before 
there was a stronger emphasis in a strict screening before providing the loan, and costly 
monitoring after it, the lender now can more easily monitor the loan and quickly 
intervene if necessary (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). 
Increased productivity of the lenders (Petersen & Rajan, 2002), and better small 
business credit-scoring methods (DeYoung et al, 2011), are primary drivers of increased 
borrower-lender distances. 
2.4.3.2 Number of Relationships 
Many SMEs tend to concentrate their borrowing from one source, although this 
concentration decreases as the firm increases in size (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). The 
explanation with stronger support for this is that multiple contacts may weaken 
relationships with the lenders (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Behr and Güttler (2007) claim that companies with an institution acting as the primary 
relationship banker will not usually have multiple bank relationships. However, they 
refer that this puts the bank in a position to exert market power over the firm, which 
may lead to hold-up problems for the borrower (Behr & Guttler, 2007). If in a 
relationship, one party is able to take advantage of increased bargaining power over the 
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other, a hold-up problem occurs (Balkenborg et al, 2012). As an example, it may be 
costly for a buyer to switch suppliers, and the suppliers, knowing of this, raise their 
prices (Balkenborg et al, 2012). 
This is a possibility when an investment in RL is made, since changing banks is costly 
to the firm because a new bank will not have the same amount and quality of 
information, charging a superior risk premium in order to make up for it (Behr & 
Guttler, 2007). These switching costs allow the relationship banker to extract margins 
that may not correspond to the risk of the loan (Behr & Guttler, 2007). 
2.4.3.3 Multiple Products 
Especially if the lender is a bank, the borrower may obtain from it more than just loans, 
building a relationship through multiple interactions (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
A firm can add to the dimensions of the relationship by purchasing multiple services 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994). This increases the amount of information available to the 
lender, as well as the precision of that same information (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). As 
an example, by monitoring a firm’s savings account, a bank learns about the firm’s 
financial condition (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Interaction over multiple products also allows the lender to spread the costs of 
producing information, reducing the cost of providing loans and services and potentially 
increasing the availability of funds to the firm (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
2.4.3.4 Trust 
In RL, trust is an important factor, making a bank more likely to renew or extend credit 
to a firm with which a relationship based on trust is maintained (Hérnandez-Cánovas & 
Martínez-Solano, 2008). 
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Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2010) find that trust in a relationship exceeds 
the importance of the length of the relationship. The same authors also state that when 
the relationships between banks and SMEs are based on trust, it not only improves their 
access to credit, but also reduces the cost of debt, although SMEs have to pledge more 
guarantees. 
2.4.3.5 Length 
A relationship between a lender and a borrower becomes more important the longer it 
exists, as the information flow between them gets better (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
The duration of the relationship can then be both a measure of its strength (Berger & 
Udell, 1995), and a measure of the private information the institution has about the firm 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Duration is an important dimension of a relationship because according to past 
experiences, the lender will expect a loan to be more or less risky (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). Assuming the relationship persists, it should reduce the expected cost of lending 
for the institution and increase its willingness to provide funds (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). 
Through time, the bank’s availability to provide funds increases, because the experience 
with the borrower allows the bank to reduce the risk assessment for each new loan 
(Hérnandez-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2008). All of this because the bank learns 
about the honesty of the manager, the viability of projects and the borrower’s risk, while 
becoming more accurate in predicting the firm’s behavior and income and improving 
the relationship (Hérnandez-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2008). 
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2.4.4 The Effects and Benefits of Relationship Lending 
For Petersen and Rajan (1994), SMEs borrow a considerable portion of their debt from 
lenders who provide them information intensive financial services, and by concentrating 
their borrowing SMEs do not seem worse off, and may even improve the conditions on 
their access to finance. 
In this section, it is reviewed the extent to which RL might be beneficial to SMEs. 
2.4.4.1 Information 
A strong benefit of RL is directly related to the major challenge SMEs face when in 
need of finance: they are vulnerable to information problems (Carbó-Valverde et al, 
2009). 
Therefore, the first benefit worthy of note is the facilitation of information exchange 
between the borrower and the lender (Boot, 2000). Through RL, the lender will have 
stronger incentives to invest in producing information about the borrower, and the latter 
will be more inclined to reveal information (Boot, 2000). 
Other than that, Boot (2000) lists a number of other benefits. Those are contractual 
features, such as flexibility in contracts, through use of impalpable information that 
facilitates long-term contracting and makes renegotiation of contract terms easier. 
According to the same author, the relationship is a commitment between the borrower 
and the bank, based on trust and respect (Boot, 2000). All together, RL allows for 
extensive adjustments that make room for better control of potential conflicts of interest 
(Boot, 2000). A specific case occurs when collateral is involved, because since it 
requires frequent monitoring, it makes both the proximity and the relationship essential 
(Boot, 2000). 
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2.4.4.2 Availability of Funds 
The information that is produced through a relationship is durable, which, together with 
economies of scale, suggests that a longer and stronger relationship should increase the 
availability of funds to the firm (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) write that as a firm spends more time in a relationship, the 
available finance from institutions increases. This happens as the ties and the number of 
financial services increase, and as the borrower concentrates its borrowing with the 
lender. As the firm attempts to establish more relationships and borrows from multiple 
lenders, the available funds decrease (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
It is defended, by Petersen and Rajan (1994), that the availability of funds is the primary 
benefit of RL, and that this benefit surpasses the one verified on the price of credit. This 
might be explained by the information monopoly the lender might exert on the 
borrower, or by the fact that firms would prefer more rather than cheaper credit, if 
offered a choice (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
2.4.4.3 Prices and Collateral 
If information asymmetry decreases over the time a borrower and a lender spend 
developing a relationship, it can be reasonably assumed this would lead to better loan 
conditions (St-Pierre & Bahri, 2011). 
Banks overcome these asymmetry problems by producing and processing information, 
and by setting on the loan contracts the interest rates that will be charged, as well as the 
collateral required (Berger & Udell, 1995). 
Berger and Udell (1995) find that longer relationships often result on lower interest 
rates, and decrease the probability of the firm having to pledge collateral. 
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 2.4.4.4 The Drawback of Relationship Lending  
In this section, it is further discussed the informational monopoly problems referred in 
section 2.4.3.2. 
When new potential lenders do not have access to the information generated by the 
older and current lender, this same current lender acquires an information monopoly 
over the firm (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
This is consistent with the claims of Hérnández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2008), 
who state that RL might not be entirely beneficial to SMEs. This happens because it 
reduces the firm’s flexibility to change banks, providing the lender with the power to 
charge higher interest rates (Hérnandez-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2008). They find 
that SMEs with longer bank relationships have enhanced access to loans, but they suffer 
higher costs for their debt. 
Although RL can be an effective technology in overcoming asymmetric information 
problems, this reduction of asymmetry is one-sided, remaining in the customer-bank 
direction (Behr & Guttler, 2007). The lender will have no incentive to increase the 
transparency level about the way it measures the loan risk and decides on the loan price, 
since a reduction on this lack of transparency could open doors to alternative sources of 
financing to the borrower, and put him in a position to renegotiate the conditions on the 
loan (Behr & Guttler, 2007). 
2.5 Drivers and Obstacles in Lending to SMEs 
Banks have a duty to protect their depositors’ savings. Hence, when granting business 
loans, the decision must be based on the default risk and the borrower’s ability to repay 
(St-Pierre & Bahri, 2011). Credit process is a critical bank function, having to ensure 
that funds will be provided as credit to customers who are both capable and willing to 
repay the loan and the interest (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). 
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The risk preferences of borrowers and lenders differ. An investment in a project has two 
possible outcomes. It may generate a profit, if the project is successful, or the 
investment may be lost, if the project is unsuccessful (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). If that 
same project is funded by a loan, that limits the borrower’s potential loss, although it 
does not limit its profits, apart from the interest (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). If the project 
is unsuccessful, the potential losses for the borrower are smaller than the lender’s, 
because he loses the amount lent (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). 
That is supported by the fact that investors will have stronger incentive to use their own 
money to fund projects where there is less risk and more assurance of return, while 
borrowing money for riskier projects (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). To deal with this 
potential problem, the lender needs to gather information that speaks to the probability 
of the borrower failing to repay the loan (Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). 
Bruns and Fletcher (2008) find that the lending officer’s credit decision-making is 
affected by a number of factors, such as past performance, financial standing, 
competence within the business project, collateral, CEO tenure or risk-taking proclivity, 
among others. Some of these factors shift the risk-taking to the borrowing SME, such as 
collateral, making possible opportunistic behavior by the borrower less of a problem 
(Bruns & Fletcher, 2008). According to the same authors, past success indicators, such 
as financial standing and competence within the business project, play an important role 
in the decision-making, which suggests that for banks the past acts as a relatively good 
predictor of the future. 
On interest rates, St-Pierre and Bahri (2011) write that the risk premium is determined 
by firm size, line of credit size, ability to repay, the relationship between the lender and 
the borrower and the length of that same relationship. However, the interest rate the 
bank charges does more than reflect the riskiness of the borrower, since it might itself 
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affect the riskiness of the loan (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This is related with the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Potential borrowers willing to pay 
higher interest rates may be worse risks, because they perceive their probability of 
repaying the loan to be low. On the other hand, high interest rates decreases the return 
on projects, and may induce the borrower to welcome projects with lower probability of 
success, but higher payoff when successful (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). So, by increasing 
interest rates or collateral on loans, the lender could increase the riskiness of his loan 
portfolio or discourage safer investors (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
It is established that SMEs and newly created companies tend to pose a bigger risk for 
banks, which find in SME lending a higher rate of default (St-Pierre & Bahri, 2011). 
These firms lack trading history, and make factors such as previous experiences of the 
entrepreneur, together with his or her age and credit history, more important (Deakins et 
al, 2010). 
Apart from that, banks perceive macroeconomic instability in developing countries and 
competition in developed countries to be the main obstacles for SME finance (Beck et 
al, 2008). 
2.6 SME Serving Profitability for Banks (an analysis by the International Finance 
Corporation) 
The SME market has been perceived as difficult, risky and costly in the past 
(International Finance Corporation, 2009). Nonetheless, recent evidence suggests that 
banks are investing and finding decent solutions to overcome this challenge, such as 
determining credit risk and lowering operating costs, being now able to serve the SME 
sector and do it with profit. 
SME banking should be looked upon as an industry in transition, becoming a strategic 
target of banks worldwide, gradually overcoming the conception of being a market 
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considered difficult to serve. This market is now served by a wide spectrum of banks, 
instead of just smaller banks with relationship-based models. 
This is in part motivated by the shrinking margins in corporate banking, forcing banks 
to turn to the SME space. This, in turn, forces the banks in a position where they start to 
understand the particular needs of the SME segment, developing approaches to 
overcome the challenges of high credit risk historically associated to these firms. 
Despite the challenges presented by the economic crisis, and even the uncertainty ahead, 
many banks appear to be invested in the SME sector, especially in emerging markets, 
often motivated by the importance of this sector to the national economy as a whole. 
This investment is also motivated by the understanding that SME banking goes beyond 
lending, and banks are now prioritizing non-lending products in order to provide total 
customer value. 
However, the growth of SMEs continues to be undersupplied, since their needs for 
financial products and services are not fulfilled. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This study has the purpose to analyze how SMEs percept some of the aspects that gather 
general consensus in the literature regarding SME finance, mainly SME access to bank 
credit and RL. 
This study consists of a quantitative research. It is aimed to quantify the perceptions of 
the respondents and generalize results obtained through a sample of 48 answered online 
surveys, where each of the respondents represents a different SME. The data was then 
used to assess the validity of different created research questions. 
1. Objective 1: verify how SMEs in the Eastern Group of the Azores region 
perceive the difficulties in accessing bank credit. Along with this, the study 
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analyzes their perception over the factors they think affect their chance in 
accessing finance, comparing this perception to the literature considerations. 
From this objective, the following research questions are created: 
RQ1: Do SMEs in the Eastern Group of the Azores region feel that accessing bank 
credit is difficult? 
RQ2: Do the perceptions of SMEs in the Azores region over the criteria that affects 
their chances in accessing bank credit matches with the considerations of the literature? 
 
2. Objective 2: The second one is to verify if RL is common in region, and if 
SMEs perceive the benefits of this technology and the reasons why those exist 
accordingly with the reasons and justifications presented in the literature. 
To be able to fulfill this objective, the following research questions were created: 
RQ3: Is Relationship Lending is a common practice in the region? 
RQ4: Do SMEs that are involved in a relationship with a bank have access to the 
benefits the referred by the literature? 
RQ5: Do SMEs perceive the reasons why the benefits from Relationship Lending occur 
in the same way the literature does? 
 
The survey was built to be able to collect data that relates to the objectives defined. 
Being that the intention is to compare the perceptions of SMEs to the considerations of 
the literature, the survey was constructed based on those same considerations (see 
appendix I). 
The reason why an online survey research method was chosen was for the convenient 
data gathering, being that the SMEs that were to be contacted on this study were far, 
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and hard to reach through a paper survey. Also, by using an online survey through a 
survey software, the randomness of the study was ensured.  
On the other hand, by using a survey, there is the risk of the respondent not fully 
understanding the questions, especially when answering online. Also, by using a survey 
and not interviews, the respondents might feel limited to the range of responses made 
available to them. But since this study is also a comparative exercise, wanting to see if 
the perceptions of the respondents match with the literature considerations, an online 
survey with a majority of closed-ended questions was chosen as the most adequate to do 
so. 
 The survey consists of 10 questions, and apart from questions 1 and 2, they are all 
closed-ended questions. On the closed-ended questions, some are two-pointed 
(questions 5 and 6), some are multiple choice (questions 4, 7 and 8) and others are 
scaled (questions 3, 9 and 10, where the last two are analyzed through a Likert scale). 
Also, some are contingency questions, since a response is only asked if the respondent 
provides a particular response in prior questions (questions 6, 7 and 8). Questions 1 and 
2 are open-ended. 
The survey was spread through the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Ponta 
Delgada
5
 (CCIPD) that made it available to enterprises that are associated with them, 
safeguarding the randomness of the study. The institution was contacted on March the 
23rd, and agreed to cooperate. On May the 1st, the link to the survey was made 
available, and was sent to CCIPD associates, through their organization. The answers 
were collected using the Survey Monkey
6
 service between May the 1st and May the 
                                                 
5
 An organization associated with natural and legal persons that perform activities related to 
trade, industry, tourism and services and are registered on the islands of São Miguel and Santa Maria, 
Azores, and whose main purpose is to promote the economic activity and to represent and defend the 
interests of its associates. 
6
 A web survey development cloud based company. 
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31st, and were then analyzed using Microsoft Excel and SPSS Statistics software. 48 
SMEs answered the survey. 
The theoretical framework supporting the construction of the survey is presented on 
appendix I. The survey is available in appendix II and III, in English and Portuguese. 
The frequencies for each question in the survey are displayed in appendix IV. 
4. RESULTS 
In the literature review many of the most debated issues regarding SME finance were 
analyzed. That being done, and being the purpose of this study to analyze how SMEs 
percept some of these issues, it was important to build a survey that was adequate to do 
so. 
Although some of the questions are contingency questions, most of them stand on their 
own, and are related to a specific issue. Therefore, they are analyzed one by one. 
Questions 1 and 2 were included to ensure that the respondents were in fact SMEs. The 
respondents were asked to indicate their annual turnover and number of employees. The 
answers were then divided within 3 SME categories: Micro
7
, small
8
 and medium 
enterprises (SMEs that don’t fit the micro or small categories). None of the respondents 
exceeded the limits on the questions, and all of the answers were valid for the purpose 
of the study. 87,5% of the respondents had an annual turnover lower than 2M EUR, and 
12,5% were between 2M EUR and below 10M EUR. None had an annual turnover 
between 10M EUR and 50M EUR. Regarding the number of employees, 56,3% had 
below 10, 35,4% had between 10 and below 50 employees, while the remainder 8,3% of 
the respondents employed between 50 and up to 250 workers. 
                                                 
7
 Enterprise that employs fewer than 10 persons and has an annual turnover not exceeding 2 
million EUR. 
8
 Enterprise that employs fewer than 50 persons and has an annual turnover not exceeding 10 
million EUR. 
 
Vítor Cruz  RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND SME FINANCING IN THE AZORES 22 
22 
 
In question 3, the purpose is to analyze how SMEs in the region perceive the difficulty 
in accessing bank financing. To do so, a scale stretching from Very Difficult (1) to Very 
Easy (5) was built, on a 5-point scale. Most firms find it difficult to access bank 
financing, having 12 respondents (25%) selected Very Difficult and 19 (39,6%) selected 
Difficult. 
In question 4, the intention was to obtain answers from the firms that could be 
compared to what the literature states to be the most common criteria considered in 
credit decision-making. Each respondent was asked to choose up to 4 aspects they 
thought were to have most negative impact on the chances to access bank credit. The 
two most selected answers, and the only two that were selected by more than 50% of the 
respondents, were: firm/owner has an unfavorable credit episode and trouble pledging 
the demanded collateral. Refusal or inability to provide information was the least 
common answer, being selected by only 14,6% of the respondents. 
Question 5 has the purpose to analyze the extent to which SMEs in the region are 
invested in RL. To do so, it was asked directly to the respondents, following Boot’s 
definition (2000) of RL, if they were in a long, diverse and close relationship with a 
bank from which they acquired different services and products. Only 6 of the 
respondents (12,5%) don’t consider to be involved in a relationship with a bank that fits 
Boot’s definition of RL, while the remaining 42 (87,5%), consider to be. 
Questions 6, 7 and 8 are RL related, and are built to be answered considering the 
respondent’s experience and perception on the matter. Everyone that answered no in 
question 5 was asked to skip to question 9. 
In question 6, the intent is to see if the respondents that are invested in RL consider it to 
be easier to access credit with that bank, and if they are able to do so in more favorable 
conditions. 
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Since 6 respondents answered no in question 5, only a total of 42 answered to question 
6. Out of those 42, 23,8% don’t feel like they benefit from a credit related aspect in the 
relationship, while 76,2% do. Similar to question 5, respondents that answered no in 
question 6 are asked to skip to question 9. 
Question 7 has the purpose of checking if the relationship related benefits the 
respondents consider to experience match with the ones considered in the literature. A 
total amount of 32 respondents (66,7% of the total sample) answered this question, 
since 16 answered no either in question 5 or 6. 
Less demanding collateral (62,5%), and Better interest rate (56,3%), were the most 
selected answers, and the only ones chosen by more than 50% of the respondents. No 
need to pledge collateral was not selected by any of the 32 respondents, ability to access 
more finance was selected by 37,5%, and access the full amount of the loan asked was 
selected by 31,3%. Only 2 respondents didn’t feel like they did benefit from any of the 
options provided. 
Question 8 aims to see if the respondents perceive why the benefits from RL happen for 
the same reasons the literature does. 
As it was in question 7, 32 respondents (66,7% of the sample) answered this question. 
They were able to select any of the options provided. 
None of the respondents felt like none of the options provided had an impact or made 
room for a credit related benefit. The bank develops a better understanding of the 
business (28,1%), and the bank has a physical presence near the firm (15,6%), were the 
least selected options. 
The Bank having an easier time financially analyzing the company (90,6%), bank 
having privileged knowledge on how the company is managed (68,8%) and Trust 
(68,8%), were all very commonly selected. 
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Question 9 was included to be able to assess the general perception of SMEs about the 
potential benefits of RL, and do so including input of all the respondents. 
A five-point scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) was 
created, and most of the respondents felt that a longer, more intense and diverse 
relationship with a bank may create value for the company. None strongly disagreed 
with the statement, while 45,8% of the respondents partially agree with it and 37,5% 
strongly agree. The mean was 4,15. 
Question 10 (with a scale identical to the one in question 9) was introduced to obtain the 
respondents’ perceptions over SME sector profitability for banks. Most of the 
respondents (45,8%) partially agree with the statement, while the option partially 
disagree was the second most common (20,8%). The mean here was 3,54. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As it has been referenced before, the focus of this study was to analyze some of the 
most common debated issues within the literature regarding SME finance, and then, 
through a survey, confront the authors’ conclusions on some of this issues with the 
perception of a number of SMEs in the Eastern Group of the Azores, a region highly 
dependent on these firms and that leads the rate at which businesses are renewed in the 
country. 
The answers of the respondents in question 3 of the survey verify the occurrence of 
RQ1. The majority of the respondents consider it to be difficult to access bank 
financing, which is accordant to the European Commission’s (2013A) statement that 
access to finance is expensive and difficult in Portugal.  
From the answers to question 4 of the survey, RQ2 is verified.  The respondents 
consider that trouble pledging collateral (a risk shifting factor) and having an 
unfavorable credit history (past success indicator) to be the strongest negative factors 
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affecting a firm’s ability to access credit. These criteria are referred by Bruns and 
Fletcher (2008) as having the strongest effect in the probability of accessing finance. 
The respondents don’t, however, seem to percept information problems to have the 
same weight as the literature does, specifically according to Deakins, Whittam and 
Wyper (2010), who define asymmetric information problems as the situation where a 
bank lacks the adequate information to decide whether or not to fund a certain proposal. 
Either by declining or by being unable to provide required information, a firm 
aggravates the asymmetric information problem. And since it is crucial for lenders to 
assess the credit worthiness of the borrowers (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004), not 
considering this could negatively affect the difficulty an SME would find in accessing 
credit. On the other hand, the answer pattern may also be explained by most of the 
respondents being invested in RL, since this technology facilitates the information 
exchange (Boot, 2000).  
RL seems to be common in the region, and also seems to have the positive impact 
claimed by Berger and Udell (1995).  Therefore, RQ3 and RQ4 are verified. A concise 
87,5% (out of 48 respondents) claims to be invested in RL, and out of those that are (42 
respondents), 76,2% feel like they benefit from a credit related aspect from that 
relationship. Having to pledge less demanding collateral and benefiting from a better 
interest rate were the most common selected benefits, which suggests that in the region 
the price of credit and the demanded collateral benefits surpass that of the availability of 
funds. This supports the allegations of Berger and Udell (1995), who claim that both 
collateral and loan rate conditions improves with RL, and not the ones of Hérnandez-
Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2008), who find that SMEs with longer banking 
relationships suffer higher costs for their debt, while having more access to loans. On 
the other hand, it cannot clearly be stated that these results go against the considerations 
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of Petersen and Rajan (1994), who find a small effect of relationships in credit price, 
because the impact of the loan rate the respondents seem to observe is not measured. 
However, Petersen and Rajan (1994) state that availability of funds is often the priority 
choice of SMEs, and therefore is the main benefit of RL. In this study, that was clearly 
not the case, since ability to access more finance and access to the full amount of the 
loan asked were both less common answers.  
As for the respondents’ perceptions on why these benefits exist, from the analysis of 
question 8, the bank having physical presence near the company appears not to be 
considered as important as other characteristics of the relationship. This is in line with 
the results of Petersen and Rajan (2002), who find that borrower-lender distances are 
increasing. Being easier for the bank to financially analyze the firm, bank acquiring 
privileged knowledge on how the company is managed and the existence of trust 
between the bank and the business owner are understood by the respondents as an 
important dimension of the relationship. This is accordant with Petersen and Rajan’s 
(1994) considerations, as well as with the ones of Hérnandez-Cánovas and Martínez-
Solano (2008). RQ5 is therefore verified. Still, it is worthy of note that the respondents 
appear to feel that the bank being in contact with the local community has low influence 
in generating credit related benefits. On a similar note, the bank developing a better 
understanding on the activity of the business also isn’t considered by the respondents to 
have considerable impact on possible benefits. 
By including the input of the respondents that are either not invested in a relationship 
with a bank or that don’t see any credit related benefit in it, on question 9, the general 
perception was still that a strong number of the respondents felt like RL has potential to 
create value for a business.  
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The International Finance Corporation (2009) claims that banks are being forced to turn 
and look upon the SME segment in a different, more favorable way, and the majority of 
the respondents seem to partially agree that the SME segment is looked upon as 
profitable by banks.  
Concerning the limitations of the study, the first one has to do with the number of 
answers to the survey acquired. According to the National Institute for Statistics 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2010), in 2008 there were 3969 SMEs in the whole 
Azores region. Considering that number, the conducted study was only able to gather 
the perception of approximately 1,2% of the total number of SMEs in the region. Even 
though the number 3969 refers to the whole archipelago, and the study conducted only 
aims at the SMEs established in the Eastern Group (2 out of 9 islands), the conclusions 
still have to be looked upon as possibly limited, since the majority of the SMEs are 
concentrated in the Eastern Group. Another limitation has to do with this question: to 
what point does the current economic situation and the financial crisis that has been 
installed since 2007/2008 affects the answers and the perception of the respondents, and 
to what extent? 
As for further suggestions, it could be of use to SMEs to conduct a study aimed at the 
perceptions of banks in the region, in a way to analyze the criteria they most commonly 
use on their credit concession decisions. This study helps SMEs to compare their 
perceptions with the ones of the literature. A study that allowed the firms to compare 
their perceptions with the standards and criteria most used by banks in their area may 
provide them valuable insights. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I – Theoretical Framework for the construction of the Survey 
Topic/Subject/(Question) Author(s) Content 
Annual turnover (1) 
Number of employees (2) 
European 
Commission 
(2003) 
“The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of 
enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not 
exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 
million.” 
Considering your 
experience, how do you 
rate the difficulty in 
accessing bank finance? 
(3) 
European 
Central Bank 
(2013) 
“ (…) ‘Finding customers’ remained the dominant concern (…) ‘Access to finance’ was 
mentioned by the second largest percentage of euro area SMEs” 
European 
Commission 
(2013A) 
“In 2012, access to finance remained difficult and expensive for SMEs in Portugal” 
The firm/owner has an 
unfavorable credit episode 
(4) 
Bruns & 
Fletcher 
(2008) 
“Another interesting observation is that the three most important factors are all related to 
the past success of the company” 
Deakins, 
Whittam & 
Wyper 
(2010) 
““Entrepreneurs seeking to start new businesses will find it more difficult because of the 
lack of any trading history. In such circumstances previous experience, age and credit 
history of the entrepreneur will be important. 
Trouble pledging the 
demanded collateral (4) 
Bruns & 
Fletcher 
(2008) 
“Out of the four factors that have the strongest effect on the probability of supporting credit, 
three relate to tangible features that reduce the risk of the bank and shift the risk-taking to 
the borrowing SME, namely past performance, financial standing, and collateral.” 
Refusal or inability to 
provide certain specific 
information (4) 
Elyasiani & 
Goldberg 
(2004) 
“It is important for prudent lenders to gather information about the credit worthiness of the 
borrowers.” 
Deakins, 
Whittam & 
“Asymmetric information exists in situations in which bank officers will not have ‘perfect’ 
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Wyper 
(2010) 
information on funding proposals.” 
The amount of the loan 
asked (4) 
St-Pierre & 
Bahri (2011) 
“Our study of the sample revealed that the determinants of risk premium are firm size, line 
of credit size (…).” 
Purpose of the loan (4) 
Berger & 
Udell (2002) 
“Small firms with opportunities to invest in positive net present value projects may be 
blocked from doing so because potential providers of external finance cannot readily verify 
that the firm has access to a quality project (…).” 
Firm size (4) 
St-Pierre & 
Bahri (2011) 
“Our study of the sample revealed that the determinants of risk premium are firm size, line 
of credit size (…).” 
Firm age (4) 
Deakins, 
Whittam & 
Wyper 
(2010) 
“Entrepreneurs seeking to start new businesses will find it more difficult because of the lack 
of any trading history.” 
Absence of a prior 
relationship with the bank 
(4) 
St-Pierre & 
Bahri (2011) 
“Our study of the sample revealed that the determinants of risk premium are (…) the 
relationship between the banker and the entrepreneur and the length of the relationship with 
the bank.” 
Can your company claim 
to have a long, diverse and 
close relationship with a 
bank, acquiring different 
services and products 
from it (online banking, 
savings account, etc.)? (5) 
Boot (2000) 
“We define relationship banking as the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary that: 
i. Invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and 
ii. Evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the 
same customer over time and/or across products.” 
Do you think that with 
that bank it is easier to 
access a line of credit, and 
do so in more favorable 
conditions? (6) 
Berger & 
Udell (1995) 
“Evidence indicates that small firms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower 
rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other small firms.” 
St-Pierre & 
Bahri (2011) 
“It is reasonable to think the information asymmetry should decrease over time as the 
relationship between banker and entrepreneur develops, leading to better loan conditions.” 
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Get a more favorable 
interest rate than you 
would from another bank 
(7) 
Berger & 
Udell (1995) 
“The collateral findings are also consistent with loan rate findings- in both cases, borrowers 
with longer relationships receive easier loan terms from their banks” 
Petersen & 
Rajan (1994) 
“We find a small effect of relationships on the price charged by lenders. The length of an 
institution's relationship with the firm seems to have little impact on the rate.” 
There is no need to pledge 
collateral (7) 
Berger & 
Udell (1995) 
“Our empirical result is that collateral is less often pledged in a mature relationship.” 
The collateral required is 
less demanding than it 
would be with another 
bank (7) 
Berger & 
Udell (1995) 
“The collateral findings are also consistent with loan rate findings- in both cases, borrowers 
with longer relationships receive easier loan terms from their banks (lower rates, fewer 
collateral requirements)” 
Have access to a larger 
line of credit; 
Get the full amount that 
was applied for (7) 
Petersen & 
Rajan (1994) 
“Both effects reduce the lender's costs of providing loans and services, and the former 
effect increases the availability of funds to the firm.” 
Elyasiani & 
Goldberg 
(2004) 
“The area of greatest concern is credit availability to small business. Because of scale 
economies and durability of information, a firm having a longer and a stronger pre-existing 
relationship with its bank should have greater availability of funds and/or lower cost of 
funds.” 
It is easier for the bank to 
financially analyze the 
company, because it has 
access to the firm’s 
savings, debit and credit 
information, etc. (8) 
Petersen & 
Rajan (1994) 
“The lender can learn about the firm's sales by monitoring the cash flowing through its 
checking account or by factoring the firm's accounts receivables.” 
“The empirical results suggest that the availability of finance from institutions increases as 
the firm spends more time in a relationship, as it increases ties to a lender by expanding the 
number of financial services it buys from it, and as it concentrates its borrowing with the 
lender.” 
The bank has privileged 
knowledge about how the 
firm is managed (8) 
Hérnandez-
Cánovas & 
Martínez-
Solano 
(2008) 
“Banks learn about the honesty of the manager, the viability of the projects, and the 
borrower’s risk as the borrower pays back their loans. In addition, the bank’s accuracy in 
predicting the firm’s behavior and its future income improves with the relationship.” 
There is trust between the 
bank and the business 
owner (8) 
Hérnandez-
Cánovas & 
Martínez-
Solano 
(2008) 
“As for the existence of trust, a bank is more likely to renew financing to the firms with 
which it maintains a relationship based on trust.” 
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The bank develops a better 
understanding on the 
business activity of the 
firm (8) 
Berger & 
Udell (2002) 
“Additional information may also be gathered through contact with other members of the 
local community, such as suppliers and customers, who may give specific information 
about the firm and owner or general information about the business environment in which 
they operate. 
The bank is physically 
present near the firm, 
which contributes to a 
better understanding of its 
integration in the local 
community (8) 
Petersen & 
Rajan (2002) 
“Our finding that the physical distance between lender and borrower has expanded and that 
the interaction between the two has become less personal is consistent with the intuition 
that information technology is replacing the traditional role of the loan officer.” 
Berger & 
Udell (2002) 
“Relationship lending is generally associated with the collection of `soft' information over 
time through relationships with the firm, the owner, and the local community.” 
“Additional information may also be gathered through contact with other members of the 
local community, such as suppliers and customers, who may give specific information 
about the firm and owner or general information about the business environment in which 
they operate.” 
Having a longer, more 
intense and diverse 
relationship with a bank 
may create value for the 
business (9) 
Berger & 
Udell (1995) 
“Evidence indicates that small firms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower 
rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other small firms.” 
St-Pierre & 
Bahri (2011) 
“It is reasonable to think the information asymmetry should decrease over time as the 
relationship between banker and entrepreneur develops, leading to better loan conditions.” 
Banks consider small and 
medium enterprises to be a 
profitable segment (10) 
International 
Finance 
Corporation 
(2009) 
“SME banking is an industry in transition. From a market that was considered too difficult 
to serve, it has now become a strategic target of banks worldwide.” 
“Despite the recognized importance of the SME sector, evidence indicates that SMEs 
continue to be undersupplied with the financial products and services that are critical to 
their growth.”  
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Appendix II – Survey 
1. Annual Turnover. 
 
2. Number of Employees. 
 
3. Considering your experience, how do you rate the difficulty in accessing bank 
finance? 
a. Very Difficult 
b. Difficult 
c. Moderate 
d. Easy 
e. Very Easy 
 
4. Choose up to 4 criteria you think may contribute to increase the difficulty to access 
bank finance. 
• The firm/owner has an unfavorable credit episode; 
• Trouble pledging the demanded collateral; 
• Refusal or inability to provide certain specific information; 
• The amount of the loan asked; 
• Purpose of the loan; 
• Firm size; 
• Firm age; 
• Absence of a prior relationship with the bank; 
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5. Can your firm claim to have a long, diverse and close relationship with a bank, 
acquiring different services and products from it (online banking, savings account, etc.)? 
If your answer is no, skip to question 9. 
• Yes 
• No 
 
6. Do you think that with that bank it is easier to access a line of credit, and do so in 
more favorable conditions? If your answer is no, skip to question 9. 
• Yes 
• No 
 
7. In what way do you feel that the relationship benefits you? Choose the options you 
agree with. 
• Get a more favorable interest rate than you would from another bank; 
• There is no need to pledge collateral; 
• The collateral required is less demanding than it would be with another bank; 
• You have access to a larger line of credit; 
• Get the full amount that was applied for; 
• None of the above 
 
8. From what characteristics of the relationship you believe these benefits result? 
Choose the options you agree with. 
• It is easier for the bank to financially analyze the firm, because it has access to 
the its savings, debit and credit information, etc.; 
• The bank has privileged knowledge about how the firm is managed; 
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• There is trust between the bank and the business owner; 
• The bank develops a better understanding on the business activity of the firm; 
• The bank is physically present near the firm, which contributes to a better 
understanding of its integration in the local community; 
• None of the above; 
 
9. Having a longer, more intense and diverse relationship with a bank may create value 
for the business. 
• Strongly disagree 
• Disagree 
• Undecided 
• Agree 
• Strongly agree 
 
10. Banks consider small and medium enterprises to be a profitable segment 
• Strongly disagree 
• Disagree 
• Undecided 
• Agree 
• Strongly agree 
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Appendix III – Survey (Portuguese Version) 
Portuguese 
 
1. Volume de negócios da empresa. 
 
2. Número de trabalhadores da empresa. 
 
3. Considerando a sua experiência, como classifica o grau de dificuldade para obter 
financiamento bancário? 
• Muito difícil 
• Algo difícil 
• Moderado 
• Algo fácil 
• Muito fácil 
 
4. Escolha até 4 fatores que considere poderem contribuir mais acentuadamente para um 
maior nível de dificuldade no acesso ao financiamento bancário. 
• A empresa/gestor apresenta um episódio de crédito desfavorável; 
• Dificuldades em prestar as garantias bancárias exigidas; 
• Recusa/dificuldade em fornecer determinada informação; 
• A dimensão do empréstimo pedido; 
• O objetivo do empréstimo; 
• A dimensão da empresa; 
• A idade da empresa; 
• A ausência de relacionamento prévio com o banco; 
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5. Pode a empresa afirmar ter com determinado banco uma relação longa, próxima e 
diversificada, com prestação de vário serviços e produtos (online banking, depósitos, 
empréstimos, etc.)? Se responder não, passe à questão 9. 
• Sim 
• Não 
 
6. Pode afirmar que, junto desse banco, apresenta menor dificuldade em obter 
financiamento e consegue-o de forma mais favorável? Se responder não, passe à 
questão 9. 
• Sim 
• Não 
 
7. De que forma sente que essa relação lhe é benéfica? Assinale as opções que entender. 
• Consegue uma taxa de juro mais favorável; 
• Não lhe são exigidas garantias bancárias; 
• A exigência de garantias bancárias é menor; 
• Consegue um montante de empréstimo; 
• Consegue a totalidade do montante de empréstimo pedido; 
• Nenhuma das anteriores; 
 
8. De que aspetos da relação entende que resultam esses benefícios? Assinale as opções 
que entender. 
• O banco tem maior facilidade em formular uma análise financeira da empresa, 
por ter acesso aos depósitos empresa, movimentos de débito e crédito, etc.; 
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• Há um maior conhecimento por parte do banco sobre a forma como a empresa é 
gerida; 
• Há um nível de confiança superior entre o banco e o/a gestor(a) da empresa; 
• O banco tem um melhor entendimento sobre a área de negócio da empresa; 
• O banco tem presença física junto da empresa, o que contribui para uma melhor 
compreensão da sua integração na comunidade local; 
• Nenhuma das anteriores; 
 
9. Manter uma relação de maior duração, intensidade e diversidade com um banco pode 
criar valor para uma empresa. 
• Discordo totalmente 
• Discordo parcialmente 
• Indiferente 
• Concordo parcialmente 
• Concordo totalmente 
 
10. Os bancos consideram lucrativo o segmento de mercado composto por pequenas e 
médias empresas. 
• Discordo totalmente 
• Discordo parcialmente 
• Indiferente 
• Concordo parcialmente 
• Concordo totalmente 
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Appendix IV - Frequencies 
TABLE I 
ANNUAL TURNOVER 
 
TABLE II 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Below 10 27 56,3 56,3 56,3 
Between 10 and 
below 50 
17 35,4 35,4 91,7 
Between 50 and up 
to 250 
4 8,3 8,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE III 
DIFFICULTY ACCESSING FINANCE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Very Difficult 12 25,0 25,0 25,0 
Difficult 19 39,6 39,6 64,6 
Neutral 12 25,0 25,0 89,6 
Easy 3 6,3 6,3 95,8 
Very Easy 2 4,2 4,2 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE IV 
FIRM/OWNER HAS AN UNFAVORABLE CREDIT EPISODE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 22 45,8 45,8 45,8 
Selected 26 54,2 54,2 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not exceeding 2M 42 87,5 87,5 87,5 
Between 2M and not 
exceeding 10M 
6 12,5 12,5 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
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TABLE V 
TROUBLE PLEDGING DEMANDED COLLATERAL 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 16 33,3 33,3 33,3 
Selected 32 66,7 66,7 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE VI 
REFUSAL/INABILITY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 41 85,4 85,4 85,4 
Selected 7 14,6 14,6 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE VII 
THE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 25 52,1 52,1 52,1 
Selected 23 47,9 47,9 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE VIII 
PURPOSE OF THE LOAN 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 33 68,8 68,8 68,8 
Selected 15 31,3 31,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE IX 
FIRM SIZE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 30 62,5 62,5 62,5 
Selected 18 37,5 37,5 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE X 
FIRM AGE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 39 81,3 81,3 81,3 
Selected 9 18,8 18,8 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
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TABLE XI 
NO PRIOR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POTENTIAL LENDER 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Selected 32 66,7 66,7 66,7 
Selected 16 33,3 33,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE XII 
FIRM IS INVESTED IN A LONG, CLOSE AND DIVERSE RELATIONSHIP WITH A BANK 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid No 6 12,5 12,5 12,5 
Yes 42 87,5 87,5 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE XIII 
DO YOU SEE A CREDIT RELATED BENEFIT IN THAT RELATIONSHIP 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 10 20,8 23,8 23,8 
Yes 32 66,7 76,2 100,0 
Total 42 87,5 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
6 12,5   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XIV 
BETTER INTEREST RATE 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 14 29,2 43,8 43,8 
Yes 18 37,5 56,3 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XV 
NO NEED TO PLEDGE COLLATERAL 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 32 66,7 100,0 100,0 
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
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TABLE XVI 
COLLATERAL REQUIRED IS LESS DEMANDING 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 12 25,0 37,5 37,5 
Yes 20 41,7 62,5 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XVII 
ABILITY TO ACCESS MORE FINANCE 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 20 41,7 62,5 62,5 
Yes 12 25,0 37,5 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XVIII 
ACCESS THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN ASKED 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 22 45,8 68,8 68,8 
Yes 10 20,8 31,3 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XIXN 
ONE OF THESE 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 30 62,5 93,8 93,8 
Yes 2 4,2 6,3 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
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TABLE XX 
EASIER FOR THE BANK TO PERFORM A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS ON THE FIRM 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 3 6,3 9,4 9,4 
Yes 29 60,4 90,6 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XXI 
THE BANK HAS PRIVILEGED KNOWLEDGE ON HOW THE FIRM IS MANAGED 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 10 20,8 31,3 31,3 
Yes 22 45,8 68,8 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XXII 
TRUST 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 10 20,8 31,3 31,3 
Yes 22 45,8 68,8 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XXIII 
THE BANK DEVELOPS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE 
BUSINESS 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 23 47,9 71,9 71,9 
Yes 9 18,8 28,1 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
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TABLE XXIV 
THE BANK HAS PHYSICAL PRESENCE NEAR THE FIRM, BETTER UNDERSTANDING ITS 
INTEGRATION IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 27 56,3 84,4 84,4 
Yes 5 10,4 15,6 100,0 
Total 32 66,7 100,0  
Missing Asked to ignore 16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XXV 
NONE OF THE ABOVE 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 32 66,7 100,0 100,0 
Missing Asked to 
ignore 
16 33,3   
Total 48 100,0   
 
TABLE XXVI 
A LONGER, CLOSER AND DIVERSE RELATIONSHIP MAY CREATE VALUE FOR THE 
BUSINESS 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Partially 
disagree 
3 6,3 6,3 6,3 
Undecided 5 10,4 10,4 16,7 
Partially agree 22 45,8 45,8 62,5 
Strongly agree 18 37,5 37,5 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE XXVII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (QUESTION 9) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
A longer, closer and diverse 
relationship may create valu for 
the business 
48 2 5 4,15 ,850 
Valid N (listwise) 48     
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TABLE XXVIII 
BANKS CONSIDER SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES TO BE A PROFITABLE 
SEGMENT 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
Disagree 
2 4,2 4,2 4,2 
Partially disagree 10 20,8 20,8 25,0 
Undecided 5 10,4 10,4 35,4 
Partially agree 22 45,8 45,8 81,3 
Strongly Agree 9 18,8 18,8 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
TABLE XXIX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (QUESTION 10) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Banks consider small and 
medium enterprises to be a 
profitable segment 
48 1 5 3,54 1,148 
Valid N (listwise) 48     
 
 
